Push?" (IMF 2014: 75) . This G20 track, henceforth referred to as the infrastructure push, is in essence an effort to fill a large gap in expected investments in infrastructure, a gap that is considered a * For useful comments on earlier versions of this paper I thank colleagues at the CBS Department of Business and Politics, especially Duncan Wigan, and Stephanie Hofmann and other participants in the panel on Theorizing institutions in the new power constellation at the European International Studies Association Conference, September 2015. I am also grateful to two anonymous referees whose comments led to important improvements of the paper. major impediment to global economic growth. This push is politically significant because of the scale of the effort and because of the importance of the G20. In 2009 the members of this forum designated it 'to be the premier forum for our international economic cooperation' (G20 2009, emphasis added) and these 20 countries account collectively for roughly 85% of gross world product and two-thirds of world population. Infrastructure clearly is high on the agenda of global economic policymaking, in stark contrast to the situation before the financial crisis as will be shown later. Something new is afoot and the purpose of this paper is to analyse this.
The analysis draws on historical materialism (HM) understood as a research program
based on a set of interlinked concepts and propositions that are open to development and amendment and can serve as a framework for empirical research (Lakatos 1978 ; see also Anderson 1983: 86) . HM is a large body of theory with internal discussions and it is not possible to do justice to all of this in the present context. Therefore the analysis will only use some elements from this tradition, selected because they in combination can provide an explanation for the rise of the infrastructure push as well as an assessment of its potential implications. In addition, by examining the processes that developed the infrastructure push, the analysis adds empirical flesh to the abstract conceptual bones and contributes to knowledge about how global governance has changed after the financial crisis.
The selected theoretical elements are 1) theory on economic state functions or state interventions; 2) the relative autonomy of state apparatuses; 3) that state interventions are shaped by power relations, thereby bringing in the notions of power bloc, conflicts, and hegemony within the power bloc; and 4) a historical perspective that locates new developments in the succession of growth models and hegemonic projects and their crises. Importantly, however, these theoretical elements are used in a transnationalised version as indicated by the paper's title. Therefore the first section elaborates on this, especially on the notion of the transnational state.
The next section gives a brief account of the history of the infrastructure gap, thereby documenting the existence of the gap and showing that it went inadequately addressed before the financial crisis. The third section applies the theory to explain both the rise of infrastructure as a major concern and the relative neglect of this during neoliberalism.
The fourth section gives a detailed account of the political processes of the infrastructure push and its policy content. The purpose is twofold: to provide an empirical basis for the following section's explanation of the push, and to move beyond abstract and generalizing understandings of the transnational state by providing a more fine-grained description of how it works in a specific policy area.
The fifth section then offers an explanation of the push and an assessment of its implications, combining the perspectives of state functions, power relations and the role of IOs, and situating the push in the trajectory of hegemonic projects and growth models. The concluding section sums up the key arguments and offers some final comments.
The findings and conclusions presented in this way result from a retroductive research process (Jessop 1982: 217-18; Lawson 1998: 156 ff.) . Iteratively a new phenomenon, the infrastructure push, was observed and related to selected abstract concepts from state theory, leading to hunches about how the theory could further be specified and developed to account for the new phenomenon, and to further empirical investigations to test and where appropriate reformulate the hunches.
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The infrastructure push could also be analysed from other theoretical perspectives, for instance as a constructivist narrative of the rise of certain ideas and their translation into policy prescriptions, exemplified by e.g. Mark Blyth (2002 Blyth ( , 2013 and Matthew Hoffmann (2005) . What differentiates HM from such approaches is not a denial of the importance of ideas -indeed all social practices are informed by ideas in HM theory -but the rather the insistence on relating ideas to material interests and relations of power and their embodiment in political institutions. This leads, I argue, to a fuller and more satisfactory analysis.
Theorizing the transnational state and infrastructure
Strictly speaking there is no transnational state holding a global monopoly on the legitimate use of violence or other defining state features. There is however, a multi-scalar and poly-centred system of governance (Scholte 2005: 185 -213) , a system of networked interactions of states and international organisations that lead to policy outcomes with some authority (see also Cox 1987: 253 (Robinson 2004: 101) . In a similar vein Poulantzas (2000:173) argued that economic state interventions essentially are about countering the profit rate's long term tendency to decline (see also Ougaard 2014) . In short, in HM state theory, economic state interventions are theorized as efforts to promote economic growth.
Infrastructure belongs in the category of general material preconditions for growth (Altvater 1972) , defined as facilities that are essential for the on-going operation of the economy so that their failure would impede the expanded reproduction of capitalism (Hirsch 1974 (Hirsch : 65, 2005 . Obvious examples are transportation and communication networks and energy supply. State theory further argues that if such preconditions cannot be provided by private capital the state will tendentially intervene to secure their provision. This applies for instance if the initial capital outlay is too large or the time horizon too long for any individual capital, and more generally if for some reason the expected rate of profit is too low compared to the prevailing average rate of profit (Altvater 1972: 18-19) .
It follows that it is historically contingent whether certain infrastructures are provided by the state or not, depending both on the capacity of private capital to provide them and on the needs of total capital for their provision. It further follows that if conditions change, for instance because of technological developments, material preconditions that hitherto have been provided by the state can be privatized and conversely, privately provided infrastructures can be taken over by the state if they no longer generate a sufficient rate of profit.
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These arguments have some analytical traction but they are very general and do have a flavour of economic determinism. State theory, however, combines this with explicit attention to political agency and relations of power. At a high level of abstraction, the state is conceived as a condensation of power relations between social forces which therefore profoundly shape economic state interventions (Altvater 1972; Hirsch 1974; Poulantzas 1978 Poulantzas , 2000 . This pertains both to nation states and to the transnational state (Robinson 2002; Ougaard 2004; Brand et al. 2011 ).
In the analysis of these relations, a distinction is made between on one hand relations between the power bloc and dominated and subaltern forces, and on the other hand relations within the power bloc. Both sets of relations are important and they are not independent of each other, but it is useful to treat them separately, as shown by Poulantzas (1975 Poulantzas ( , 1978 and Hirsch (2005) in empirical analyses.
Furthermore, the state is institutionalized in state apparatuses imbued with relative autonomy. Although situated in the context of power relations, the bureaucracies that staff state apparatuses have an agency of their own, shaped by the societal determination of state functions and the state personnel's interpretation of their role. This Weberian element in state theory was especially developed by Hirsch (2005: 30) and Poulantzas (1973 Poulantzas ( : 351-359, 2000 and it resonates with more recent scholarship on international organizations (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Seabrooke 2012; Grabel 2014) .
Finally, temporality is important. Capitalist society is in constant development and change, and power relations change over time. So do the ideas and discourses that shape state bureaucracies' interpretations of their tasks and duties. Regulation theory and similar strands have developed the idea that capitalist societies develop in distinct stages, 7 each marked by a specific configuration of the power bloc around a hegemonic project and an associated growth model (Lipietz 1987; Gill 1995; Aglietta 2000; Boyer and Saillard 2002; Jessop 2002; Overbeek 2004 Overbeek , 2013 McDonough 2010; Atzmüller et al. 2013 .; See also Ougaard 2016: 460 for a brief summarizing discussion). Therefore, the present push for infrastructure should be analysed in the context of the trajectory of the neoliberal hegemonic project, the crisis it led to, and the ensuing struggles over the postcrisis growth model.
In sum, the infrastructure push is to be analysed as a globalized state function, shaped by power relations, and with attention to IOs' potential for playing a relatively autonomous role. But first a brief history of the infrastructure gap is called for.
A brief history of the infrastructure gap
The World Bank has long history of supporting infrastructure projects, generally accounting for more than two thirds of its commitments in the 1950s and 1960s. But from a peak in the mid-sixties infrastructure declined relatively (Besant-Jones et al. 1994: 149 Table A3 ) and from 1993 also absolutely (discerned from World Bank 2003: 2, table) .
At the same time, however, a policy shift took place. Having realized the insufficiency of public funds, the Bank turned to market oriented approaches (Besant-Jones et al. 1994: 7-8 OECD 2004) . This led to an in-depth study of infrastructure needs in four sectors (road and rail transport, telecoms, electricity transmission and distribution and water), concluding that if electricity generation and related infrastructures also were included, total needs for the period through 2030 would amount to USD 71 trillion (tn), corresponding to around 3.5% of global GDP annually (Stevens et al. 2006: 29) . A 'gap is opening up' the organization warned, ' between the infrastructure investments required for the future, and the capacity of the public sector to meet those requirements from traditional sources' (OECD 2007:20) . 
Theoretical implications
Relating now this account of the history of the infrastructure gap to the theoretical framework, several observations can be made. Firstly, the account fits the general proposition that the transnational state tendentially intervenes to secure the provision of general material conditions for the expanded reproduction of capitalism on a global scale. It is, after all, quite plausible that a future historian will summarize this episode as one where the global political system responded to a rising impediment to global growth.
Secondly the account also shows the relevance of the notion of the relatively autonomous role of transnational state apparatuses by showing the IOs' role in identifying the issue, analysing it, and calling attention to it. But thirdly, the disjunction between the IO response and the almost lacking high-level attention at global summits calls for more discussion. If adequate infrastructure is in the interest of global capitalism and the transnational state works in the interests of transnational capital, why was the gap allowed to develop in the first place, and why did it take so long before it achieved high level political attention?
We can point to several reasons for this. One is that to some extent such a delay is not surprising. It takes time for new issues to enter the political agenda, and problems have to reach a certain level of criticality before they receive serious attention. This certainly is part of the explanation, but still, the problem was registered as a serious one at the latest in 2004 by the OECD, and it took about six years before the Leaders' level even began to mention it in public statements. The answer to this puzzle can arguably be found in the nature of the problem combined with the prevailing power relations under neoliberalism.
The problem is that infrastructure investments are a special category. They are often large scale with long time horizons, some are public goods such as roads where it is difficult to charge for the benefits they create, they often are 'complex and involve a large number of parties' and therefore require complex legal arrangements (Ehlers 2014 ). In addition, infrastructure investments in developing countries can be fraught with legal uncertainties and political risks. For such reasons infrastructure investment 'in many cases cannot be realized without some form of public support' (Ehlers 2014: 4) . In other words, some level of state intervention is required for private capital to increase its contribution to closing the infrastructure gap. Secondly, physical infrastructure is a precondition for the expansion of productive capital and power relations during neoliberalism were marked by the rise of finance in the power bloc; to the extent that this fraction became hegemonic (Duménil and Lévy 2011; Demirovic and Sablowski 2013; Ougaard 2016) . In other words, the leading force in the global business community had little material interest in addressing the issue, none the least because plenty of money could be made in financial transactions, enabled by lax regulation and innovative creation of new financial instruments. And while the sector eagerly pursued this kind of innovation, it had little or no interest in the kind of public policy innovation required to steer capital into physical infrastructure investments. These campaigns have had an impact, most notably by pressuring donor governments to encourage the WB to adopt more rigorous environmental and social policies' (Fox and Brown 1998: 1-2) .
A similar assessment is that 'civil society organisations have achieved some notable successes in improving the accountability of the WB to those who are affected by its operations' (Ebrahim and Herz 2011: 76) . This sustained and fairly successful cam-13 paign thus made large scale infrastructure projects politically costly and difficult to pursue. Relations between the power bloc and dominated social forces are in other words a factor contributing to the relative neglect of the infrastructure gap under neoliberalism.
The post-crisis infrastructure push
In this section I examine first the process through which the infrastructure push was developed, and then the content of the initiatives. The process is worth examining in some detail because it sheds useful light on the transnational state's mode of operation.
It shows that the G20 is much more than annual summits; it is an ongoing policymaking process involving decision-makers, bureaucrats, and experts from the G20 states and major IOs, and it includes dialogue with non-state actors, none the least business. The pattern is for instance described as 'IMF (lead) with input from WBG, OECD, FSB' or 'OECD (lead) with input from WBG, FSB, and UN DESA'. Of the various taskforces listed, the OECD had the lead in 11, the World Bank in eight, the IMF in three, and UNCTAD and the Financial Stability Board in two each. 
Policy Content
The purpose of these efforts is to promote investment in infrastructure along the lines first suggested by Working Group VI at the Seoul Business Summit and the HLP. They can be summarized in four main complementary streams. The first is to develop a 'pipeline of bankable projects' because, as the HLP put it, 'the constraint is less one of funding than an insufficient pipeline of bankable projects' (HLP 2011: i) . In other words, under current conditions infrastructure investments were not sufficiently profitable. The second is to mobilize additional sources of funding, the third to 'help match potential investors with projects' (G20 Australia 2014b: 4); and the fourth to promote implementation of the first three.
There are two components in the effort to develop the pipeline. The first is to create and agree upon a set of standards for 'bankable projects'. As a first step towards this end the HLP asked the MDBs 'to collectively identify exemplary regional projects, illustrating the bottlenecks and challenges raised in their Action Plan' (HLP, 2011: iv) and the resulting list was attached to the HLP report ( 2011: Appendix 2) -and became a target for criticism from NGOs as discussed below.
On the basis of this list, much additional analytical work, and extensive consultations with member states and other IOs, the above mentioned G20/OECD High-Level Princi-ples were produced and endorsed. They are designed to 'assist OECD, G20 Much of the implementation of these efforts is done by the G20 member states. The G20 is not based on a formal treaty and the commitments made by members are nonbinding and voluntary. In this environment a key compliance mechanism is mutual surveillance and peer review and the G20 has adopted a systematic approach to this, providing a basis for the ongoing application of peer pressure among members. The first Accountability Assessment Report was submitted to the 2015 Summit, and the exercise is to be repeated (G20 Framework Working Group 2015: 1). On infrastructure the report noted that 'Members have made reasonable progress on the implementation of investment commitments over the past year, with about one-third of the key commitments in this area now fully implemented,' and the report goes on to specify how individual countries have lived up to their commitments. Thus there is evidence of both peer pressure and of some compliance, an assessment that resonates with recent more general discussions of the G20 Process (Butler 2012; Derviş and Drysdale 2014; Drezner 2014) .
Impact
This, however, does not tell us anything about impact, i.e. whether the infrastructure push is successful in lifting the level of infrastructure investments. Up to the end of 2015 this seemed not to have been the case. IJGlobal, an organisation that tracks contracts on infrastructure projects globally, reported that compared to previous years the trend remained rather flat around 300 billion USD (IJGlobal 2016: 2) . This must, however, be seen in the context of the newness of the infrastructure initiative. Referring to the standard sequencing of policy cycles, the issue has been identified and framed, overall policy has been formulated and adopted, key instruments have been designed, 20 and implementation has begun, but only barely. It is simply too soon to expect a major impact. This is not to say that the intended impact is a certain thing. On the contrary, whether it eventually materializes will depend on the ability of the forces behind the policy to maintain momentum and remain in a position of strength. Therefore I now turn to a discussion of the power implications of these first steps in the policy cycle: which constellation of transnational power relations is signalled by these completed first stages of the policy cycle?
The infrastructure push and transnational power relations
Industrial hegemony
As mentioned in the theory section, state theory distinguishes between relations within the power bloc and relations between this bloc and subaltern or dominated social forces.
Focusing first on relations within the transnational power bloc, an important line of conflict is the one between industrial and financial interests (Poulantzas 1978: 133; Ougaard 2016) .
Concerning this, there are strong arguments to suggest that the infrastructure push signals a strengthening of the industrial fraction of capital. Most important is the very nature of the push. Physical infrastructure is a precondition for production and transportation of physical goods and the push is essentially about literally and figuratively paving the way for the expansion of industry and mechanized agriculture. Another argument is the business support for the push. This is for obvious reasons particularly strong from businesses that build and/or operate physical infrastructure, and this sector was, as al- Together these are compelling arguments to conclude that the infrastructure push is catering to the long term interest of industrial capital. As such it represents a clear shift from the pre-crisis situation where finance was hegemonic. This argument is amplified by the fact that in parallel with the infrastructure push, there is continued political momentum behind the drive to regulate finance. Thus an OECD study has concluded that 'reform to make finance sounder is likely to boost long-term economic growth and reduce income inequality' (OECD 2015: 4) and the G20 Leaders keep emphasizing both the need for and their commitment to carrying on with financial reform (G20 Turkey 2015b: 3).
Old and new powers
Another major line of conflict in the transnational power bloc is between the rising business communities of the emerging economies and those from the old industrialised countries (Ougaard 2016) . The creation of the G20 and its designation as their 'premier forum' for international economic cooperation clearly testifies to the increased standing of the former group in global economic politics (see also Stephen 2014) . So does the fact that the infrastructure push is much concerned with infrastructure in emerging and developing countries, although infrastructure deficiencies in the old powers also are seen as part of the problem. But importantly, there is both an aspect of rivalry and one of shared interests and both need to be addressed.
The initiation of the New Development Bank by the BRICS countries and even more so China's creation of the AIIB show that these countries found existing institutions insufficient, wanted a greater say in lending policies, and had the will and capacity to take action on their own. The fact that Japan promptly countered the AIIB with a large dose of new capital to the ADB, keeping its lending capacity superior to the AIIB, also testifies to this element of rivalry. Furthermore, there is also direct commercial rivalry because Southern companies have become a major competitor for infrastructure projects in Africa and elsewhere in the global South. If Southern companies' infrastructure investments in their own countries are added to their investments in other developing countries, they surpassed infrastructure investments from the developed world in the middle of the first decade of the century (Schur et al. 2008: 2) . Indeed, it is not farfetched to see the insistence on 'quality infrastructure', i.e. projects that meet technical, environmental and social standards, as partly reflecting a Northern effort to limit Southern competition, considering the often voiced criticism of Chinese projects for inferior quality. Project quality is likely to be one place where the North-South rivalry will play out in the infrastructure push.
This rivalry, however, is set in the context of a more fundamental shared interest, namely the interest in a growing world economy and especially in growth in the global South which also will benefit Northern capital. This is clearly articulated in the G20 discourse On balance, the G20's infrastructure initiative reflects the strengthening of the Southern section of the transnational power bloc, but also the strength and growing importance of an underlying shared interest between North and South. In this composite picture, nothing suggests that the Southern section is not still in a secondary position.
Sustainability
Thirdly, a comment on sustainability is warranted because the conflict between green and black capital is also a major line of conflict in the transnational power bloc (Newell and Paterson 2011; Ougaard 2016) . On this the best to say is that the infrastructure initiative is neutral. Infrastructure per se is colour blind since transportation networks and energy production can be built in more or less green or black ways. Sustainability is mentioned in several policy documents but they do not go much beyond for instance stating that lack of 'a credible social and environmental impact assessment ' can be a 'potential deal breaker ' (World Bank Group and the OECD 2015: 5, 8) . Furthermore, environmental concerns are absent in the B20 input (B20 Turkey 2015a, 2015b) and members of the taskforce include both companies that have a green and clean profile, and companies from the oil and gas industries. The green agenda is pursued elsewhere, especially in global climate talks, so the infrastructure initiatives are better seen as one of the fields where the struggle between green and black is played out.
Support from Labour
Turning to relations between the power bloc and dominated social forces it is important that these, like the power bloc, are not a homogenous group. This is evident from the fact that labour and civil society organizations have taken different positions towards the infrastructure push. Labour, in other words, supports the infrastructure push, albeit with an emphasis on green growth absent in the input from business. Indeed, labour has joined forces with business in supporting the push, stressing in a joint statement 'the urgent need for governments to reinvigorate infrastructure investment and private investment in the real economy through their national investment plans' (B20 L20 Turkey 2015 2015).
Decline of NGO influence
The civil society coalition that had gained some influence on the WB in the pre-crisis years was in a different position because there is strong evidence that its influence was weakened in the turn to infrastructure. At decisive moments in the policy shift, the This critique was repeated at the 2015 Summit. Here the C20 -Civil Society 20, representing close to 500 civil society organizations from 91 countries -in the Communiqué 'A World Economy that Includes All' insisted that 'Growth must target poverty and inequality and benefit the whole of society including the most-excluded groups' (C20 Turkey 2015: 3) and that 'Investment in megaprojects is counterproductive and unsustainable when economic gains are privatised, and social and environmental costs and damages are socialized'. Therefore the C20 urged the G20 to 'Shift investments from unsustainable mega projects to decentralized, local infrastructure projects' (C20 Turkey 2015: 8). In addition to criticizing the policy content, the NGO also expressed their sense of diminished access by appealing to the G20 that it should 'Strengthen the opportunity for civil society to contribute to G20 processes by providing a permanent seat for C20 at G20 Working Groups' (C20 Turkey 2015: 3).
Concluding comments
To summarize the preceding analysis, the infrastructure push is an effort by the transnational state to remedy the infrastructure gap, a major impediment to economic growth, by inducing a massive surge in infrastructure investments, potentially, according to Nancy Alexander (2015) , 'the biggest investment boom in human history'. This fits HM state theory's claim that states tendentially intervene to provide general material conditions for capitalist production if such conditions cannot be provided by private capital and market forces. At the same time, however, the infrastructure gap was allowed to grow during neoliberalism due to the hegemony of finance, thereby showing that the functional theory of state interventions needs to be combined with the co-determination by relations of power, another central tenet of state theory. Not until after the financial crisis did infrastructure rise to the top of the global political agenda, and this reflects shifts in power relations, both within the power bloc and between the power bloc and subaltern forces.
Within the power bloc, the push signals a weakening of finance and a strengthening of the industrial fraction, to the point that the latter is hegemonic, while also showing a notable strengthening of the emerging southern section of the power bloc, although this section still is secondary to the dominant social forces those from the old industrialized economies. Concerning relations between the power bloc and subaltern social forces, in global infrastructure politics the power bloc has gained the support of organized labour, interested in 'jobs and decent work', whereas those speaking for the poorest and most vulnerable, the coalition of NGOs and Southern popular movements, have been weakened compared to the pre-financial crisis situation.
The analysis also demonstrated the relatively autonomous role of IOs, perhaps especially in issue identification and framing, but also that political leaders can mobilize and orchestrate essential and extensive support from the IOs and that decisive actions requires this kind of leadership.
Thus the analysis has shown that the combination of transnationalised versions of the three elements of HM theory can explain the rise of the push and why it came after the financial crisis, situating it in the context of successive hegemonic projects and growth models, as well as allowing an assessment of the potential implications of the push.
Furthermore, the empirical analysis provided a fine-grained picture of the transnational state, shown to be a flexible networked cooperation of national state apparatuses and international organizations in an ongoing engagement with non-state actors, especially business.
As to the potential implications, the infrastructure push suggests a hegemonic project and associated growth model centred on the global expansion of industrial capital and modern agriculture. This can entail a long period of growth and transformation of the world economy. Inherent in such a transformation will be the expansion of employment and wage labour in the growing capitalist economy, and possibly also raising material living standards. But as always capitalist development will come with human costs, especially for the already weak groups who are threatened by mega-projects and large scale industrialization.
But on a (perhaps overly) optimistic note, popular forces can to some extent influence the growth model. To the extent that they are able to pressure it towards a sustainable and socially inclusive pattern, it is a possibility that we will see on a global scale a replication, mutatis mutandis, the post-World War Two Fordist/Keynesian Welfare State growth model of the old capitalist powers of Europe and North America. This model 29 was, after all, also based on industrial hegemony and labour support, it engendered massive transformations of these societies, and it was highly successful on many accounts until, that is, it met its limits in the crisis of the 1970s.
At this point it is important to recall the caveats to these conclusions. The analysis, covering the push to the end of 2015, is based on the initial stages of the policy cycle where implementation still was merely beginning and impact assessment would be premature.
The success of the infrastructure push depends on the durability of the power relations behind these first stages in the process. Furthermore, the conflicts within the power bloc between black and green capital, and between the Northern and Southern sections are also important, and much will depend on how these conflicts play out. Finally, important questions have not been touched upon in this analysis. For instance there has been no attention to disagreements, conflicts, bargaining and compromising between Leaders and FMCBGs in the process. This observation underscores the need for more empirical research into the transnational state.
